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Abstract
Background: We examine the signaling effect of borrowers’ social media behavior,
especially self-disclosure behavior, on the default probability of money borrowers on
a peer-to-peer (P2P) lending site.
Method: We use a unique dataset that combines loan data from a large P2P lending
site with the borrower’s social media presence data from a popular social media site.
Results: Through a natural experiment enabled by an instrument variable, we
identify two forms of social media information that act as signals of borrowers’
creditworthiness: (1) borrowers’ choice to self-disclose their social media account to
the P2P lending site, and (2) borrowers’ social media behavior, such as their social
network scope and social media engagement.
Conclusion: This study offers new insights for screening borrowers in P2P lending
and a novel usage of social media information.
Keyword: P2P lending, Social media, Self-disclosure, Default, Difference-in-difference
Background
Peer-to-peer lending, also known as P2P lending, refers to the practice of lenders loaning
money to unrelated individuals through a P2P lending platform, an online venue. One
unique feature of such lending is that the loan amount is usually small. Traditional financial
institutions tend to do very little screening for small borrowers and rely excessively on
collateral (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Ang et al. 1995; Avery et al. 1998; Manove et al. 2001).
However, in P2P lending markets, borrowers do not provide collateral as protection to
lenders against default. This practice makes P2P lending particularly attractive for small
borrowers who might otherwise turn to pay day lenders or credit card debt (Adams et al. 2009).
To facilitate lenders to identify credible borrowers, P2P lending platforms encourage
borrowers to submit as much relevant information as possible. Lenders make use of
“hard” information, such as credit score, debt-to-income ratio, and annual income, and
“soft” information, such as a borrower’s picture or a textual description of the future
plan (Iyer et al. 2009), to infer borrowers’ creditworthiness. Soft information is a useful
supplement to hard information in the loan underwriting process, especially for
borrowers with poor credit, whose hard information is usually unattractive (Khwaja et al.
2013). Prior studies have examined the signaling effect of different types of soft informa-
tion, such as borrowers’ pictures, textual descriptions of the usage of loans (Khwaja et al.
2013), facial features (Theseira 2009; Pope and Sydnor 2011; Ravina 2012), and social
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network characteristics on P2P platforms (Freedman and Jin 2011; Lin et al. 2013). Unlike
these studies, the present study focuses on a new and promising category of soft
information—borrowers’ self-disclosed social media information. In P2P lending platforms,
some borrowers voluntarily disclose their social media account, which makes the related
information accessible to lenders or P2P lending platforms. Are borrowers who choose to
disclose their social media account more creditworthy than non-disclosing bor-
rowers? Is the social media information they choose to disclose useful in assessing
their default probability?
Our study intends to answer these two questions by examining a combined data set obtained
from a P2P lending platform and a social media site. With this data, we model borrowers’ de-
fault probability as a function of their choice to disclose their social media account, controlling
for relevant factors such as borrowers’ demographic characteristics and identity verification.
The result shows that borrowers who disclosed their social media information have a
significantly lower default probability compared to those who did not. To rule out the
effect of self-selection, we leverage a natural experiment introduced by the P2P lending
site that enabled borrowers to link to their social media sites. We employ the propensity
score matching (PSM) technique to assess the relationship and find that the results are
consistent. Furthermore, we examine the relationship between borrowers’ social media
engagement and their default probability. We find that social media engagement, such as
the scope of the borrowers’ social network and their activity level on a social media site,
act as predictors of their default probability.
Our study makes three contributions to the P2P lending literature. First, we discover a
predictive relationship between borrowers’ choice to disclose their social media information
and their default probability. Second, we find borrowers’ social media engagement also pre-
dicts their default probability. These findings identify a new category of soft information
that is useful for screening borrowers on P2P lending platforms. Finally, by examining a
unique data set that uniquely combines data from both a P2P lending site and a social
media site, this study is the first in the literature to integrate borrowers’ financial behavior
with their social media characteristics.
Methods
Hypotheses
In our study, borrowers disclosing their social media account on a P2P lending platform raise
the possibility that their default behavior would be revealed to their friends. A moral failure
damages one’s social image, and consequently damages social bonds to others (Baumeister and
Leary 1995; de Waal 1996; Ahmed 2001) and can lead to social punishments such as being
marginalized, ostracized, or excluded (de Waal 1996; Braithwaite 1989). Moreover, the
literature on social capital finds it to be a valuable resource (Dore 1983; Adler and Kwon
2002). Social capital originates not only from the structure and content of our social relations
but also from trust (Putnam 1995; Knoke 1999; Leana and Van Buren 1999). Finally, eco-
nomic theories of social stigma point out that a default imposes a social stigma
cost on borrowers if their friends know about the default (Crocker et al. 1998; Thorne and
Anderson 2006; Cohen-Cole and Duygan-Bump 2008). We therefore propose:
HYPOTHESIS 1. Borrowers who voluntarily disclose their social media accounts on a
P2P lending platform are less likely to default.
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HYPOTHESIS 2a. Borrowers who have a larger social network on the social media site
are less likely to default on the P2P lending platform.
HYPOTHESIS 2b. Borrowers who have more engagement on the social media site are
less likely to default on the P2P lending platform.
Data
A key, notable contribution of our study is that we combine data related to borrowers’
financial behavior from a P2P lending platform with their information on a social
media site. The P2P lending data are from one of the largest online P2P lending
platforms in China. Our data sample covers all peer-to-peer lending listings on this
company between January 2011 and August 2013. It consists of 35,457 loan records
and 11,047 borrower records in total. Variables related to listed loans include loan
amount, interest rate, opening and closing dates, credit grade ranging from A (high
quality) to HR (low quality), and the status of loan repayment. Variables related to
borrowers contain their demographic characteristics, including age, gender, education
level, and marital status, and verification items, including verification of identity card,
education certificate, phone number, and image.
Over 40% of borrowers on the P2P lending platform have disclosed their Sina micro-
blog account to the platform. Sina microblog, which was launched in September 2009,
is the largest microblog site in China and had nearly 300 million users by the end of
2013. The dataset includes a variable that indicates whether a borrower disclosed their
Sina microblog account. For those borrowers who did so (5239 borrowers in total), we
accessed their microblog page and collected relevant data. The data we thus obtained
include social network scope metrics and engagement metrics.
Results and discussions
We begin by analyzing the relationship between the default outcome and borrowers’
choice to disclose their microblog account. We use a logit regression model first, and
then utilize the PSM technique and instrument variable regressions to address endo-
geneity concerns. We estimate:
logit Defaultð Þ ¼ αþ β1Microblog disclosed þ β2Controlsþ ε ð1Þ
The results show that the microblog disclosure is negatively related to the default
probability (coefficient is −0.748), and is significant at the 0.01 level. However, the data
are unbalanced in covariates between the group who discloses their microblog and
those who do not. The unbalanced data weakens the reliability of the results of the
regression model (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009). Therefore, we utilize PSM to adjust
for the differences in covariates. The results after PSM support Hypothesis 1. We find
significant differences in the default rate between treated and control groups.
Difference-in-difference (DID) model
Although the result of the logistic model shows that disclosure of a microblog account
is a predictor of default probability, it does not identify the underlying cause: is it
because the borrowers are afraid of social stigma costs? We use a DID model to identify
the cause. In April of 2013, the P2P platform launched a marketing campaign to
encourage borrowers to disclose their microblog accounts. We estimate the effect
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of the campaign on the default probability of a loan whose borrower disclosed
their social media account. The estimated model is:
ln
P Defaultit ¼ 1ð Þ
1−P Defaultit ¼ 1ð Þ
 
¼ αþ β1Mb disclosedi þ β2Cmpit þ β3Mb disclosedi
 Cmpit þ β4Controlsi þ εit ð2Þ
The dummy variable Mb_disclosed equals 1 if the borrower of a loan has disclosed his
microblog, otherwise it equals 0. The dummy variable Cmp is a time variable, which takes
the value of 0 or 1 for periods prior to or after the disclosure campaign. Controls repre-
sent a vector of loan characteristics, such as loan amount, interest rate, and lending
period. The main parameter of interest is β3. The result of β3 is negative (−0.652) and
significant (p < 0.01), suggesting that this campaign negatively influenced the default prob-
ability of the loans whose borrowers have disclosed their social media account. One
possible reason is that these borrowers care about social stigma costs. Borrowers may
worry the P2P lending company could use their microblog account as an outlet to spread
the word if a default occurs, which would increase their social stigma costs. With this
worry in mind, they are less likely to default after the disclosure campaign.
The effect of microblog behavior on default probability
We select borrowers who disclose their microblog accounts on the P2P lending site,
and collect microblog metrics (e.g. #Followers, #Friends, #Fans and #Microblogs) from
their profile pages on sina.com. This combined data sample includes 5239 listings.
We use a logit model to estimate the default probability of the effect of the microblog
metrics on default likelihood for borrowers who have disclosed his microblog.
logit Defaultð Þ ¼ αþ β1Microblog Metricsþ β2Controlsþ ε ð3Þ
Because of the large variance and scale of the microblog metric variables, we use their
natural logs in the model.
We first analyze the effect of #Followers and #Microblogs, respectively. The inde-
pendent variable in both models is negatively related to the default probability at the
0.01 significance level. The results demonstrate that the larger the scope of the social
network a borrower has on a social media site, the less likely they are to default on a
loan; the more engagement a borrower has with his social media site, the less likely he
is to default. Both Hypotheses 2a and 2b are supported.
We next examine the effect of two different types of social network, that is, friends
and fans. For a borrower, both friends and fans on the microblog site are sources of so-
cial capital. Either friends or fans knowing about a borrower’s default can damage his
social image and cause a social stigma cost; therefore, both #Friends and #Fans influ-
ence the borrower’s default likelihood. However, as previous studies have demonstrated,
close friends have a stronger behavioral effect on each other than strangers do (Bond et
al. 2012; Christakis and Fowler 2013). We therefore expect the effect of #Friends on
borrowers’ default likelihood to be more intensive than that of #Fans. Our result shows
that #Friends and #Fans are both negatively related to the default probability with p < 0.01,
but the coefficient of #Friends (−0.153) is almost double to that of #Fans (−0.079). The
results indicate that although both variables are predictors of default likelihood, #Friends
is a stronger signal than #Fans.
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We also consider that a borrower having a large #Followers is more likely to have a
healthy financial situation as an influential person. Therefore, their low default probability
may be due to their financial well-being instead of avoiding costs in social capital. We
include an additional term to represent a borrower’s influence, which can also be regarded
as a proxy for financial position. From the Sina microblog site, we received not only data
showing how many followers a borrower has (e.g., #Followers), but also data showing how
many people the borrower is following (e.g., #Following). It is reasonable to assume that
#Followers of influential borrowers is always greater than #Following. Therefore, we
created a dummy variable “Influential,” whose value equals 1 when #Followers is greater
than #Following, and otherwise, equals 0. The result shows that #Followers remain signifi-
cant while Influential is not significant.
Conclusion
In this study, we investigate the signaling effect of social media information on borrowers’
credit worthiness in P2P lending. The results suggest that social media information can
be a signal of creditworthiness on two levels. On the first level, for all the borrowers in
the market, their decision on whether to disclose their social media accounts is a predictor
of their default probability. On the second level, for the borrowers who choose to disclose
their social media accounts, their social media metrics, such as their social network scope
and their inputs on the social media site, are predictors of their default probability.
Our study contributes to the literature across the Information Systems and Finance
disciplines. To our knowledge, it is the first study that examines the usage of social
media in personal finance. While most prior literature regards social media as a
marketing tool, we provide a new perspective by regarding social media as an informa-
tion source for individual creditworthiness. Moreover, our results provide a new insight
to improve risk control in P2P lending in China. On the one hand, individuals in China
do not have a well-verified credit score, such as a FICO score, which enlarges the
information asymmetry in Chinese P2P lending markets. On the other, about 80% of
Internet users in China have a social media account (Report on Internet Development
Status in China 2016). Their social media activity provides a rich set of information that
could be used by P2P lending markets for credit assessment. Our study demonstrates
the validity of this approach and highlights the importance of leveraging social media
information in P2P lending markets in China.
This paper is not without limitation. For example, due to data limitation, we are not able
provide the money borrowers’ detailed social media behavior information, especially their
behavior before and after the default takes place. In the future we will work with the P2P
lending company to design better experiment, to more clearly identify the impact
of self-disclosure, as well as to better address the endogeneity problem.
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